Wittgenstein's Arguments Against Philosophical Skepticism A combative therapeutic reading of pragmatist inspiration

Dammert P.L. · Ideas y Valores (2023) · DOI: 10.15446/ideasyvalores.v72supl10.90408

Resumen

The article analyzes the main intuitions of pragmatist inspiration employed by the second Wittgenstein against philosophical skepticism. Wittgenstein shares with Peirce an anti-skeptical epistemological orientation comprising three points of view: i) the rejection of philosophical doubt, ii) the commitment to certainties and fallibilism, and iii) the defense of a non-intellectualist view of belief. With James he shares a methodological approach in which he highlights the way to deconstruct and rethink philosophical problems. Knowing that epistemological orientation and this methodological approach makes clearer the therapeutic approach with which Wittgenstein fights philosophical skepticism.

Instituciones: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú