THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM FROM THE SPINOZIAN PROPOSAL; [O PROBLEMA DA LIBERDADE DA PROPOSTA ESPINOSIANA]

Rivas Diaz D.A. · Prometeica (2024) · DOI: 10.34024/prometeica.2024.29.15817

Resumen

In this paper, the problem of free will is addressed from a Spinozian point of view. Spinoza rejects freedom as free will. However, he considers that we can have agency (freedom) as long as, guided by the knowledge of the causes of our affections, we act in favor of our conatus. This research is divided into three chapters: In the first one, Spinoza's position on free will is briefly reconstructed; in the second one, his agency proposal is developed; finally, in the third one, it is intended to re-update Spinoza's considerations around the contemporary discussion on the problem of free will.

Instituciones: Universidad Nacional de San Agustín de Arequipa