SOLIDARITY AND RIVALRY IN THE SOUTHERN CONE: PERU, CHILE, AND THE FALKLANDS WAR (1982)

Rivas Plata A.R.M. · Si Somos Americanos (2026) · DOI: 10.61303/07190948.v26i.1278

Resumen

This article examines the foreign policies of Peru and Chile during the Falklands War (1982) from a structural realist perspective, proposing the distinction between defensive and offensive realism as an alternative to the idealism-realism debate. Using process tracing, the causal mechanisms explaining the decisions of both countries are reconstructed, considering evidence classified as hoop tests, smoking guns, and straws in the wind. The results show that Peru, under the government of Fernando Belaúnde Terry, acted according to a defensive realism aimed at preserving regional equilibrium and limiting Chilean influence, while simultaneously consolidating civilian authority over the Armed Forces. In contrast, Chile, led by Augusto Pinochet, adopted an offensive realism that sought to maximize its relative power and legitimize itself internationally by establishing cooperative relations with the United Kingdom. The discussion concludes that both behaviors, on the one hand, respond to different realistic rationalities adapted to their peripheral position in the international system and, on the other hand, provide evidence that the Falklands War was a critical juncture where defense and expansion coexisted under the same logic of state survival.

Instituciones: Universidad Científica del Sur