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RANSOMWARE THREATS IN SPACE MISSIONS: VULNERABILITIES AND PREVENTION STRATEGIES

Venturi Calero D.E.; Quintana Quispe F.R.; Roman-Gonzalez A. · Proceedings of the International Astronautical Congress, IAC (2025) · DOI: 10.52202/083096-0019

Resumen

As cyberthreats evolve, ransomware has established itself as one of the most disruptive risks to critical infrastructure. Although its impact on ground-based systems is widely documented, the vulnerability of space assets to this type of attack remains a largely unexplored area. The growing involvement of government agencies and private companies in space activities increases the likelihood of cybercriminals compromising satellites, control stations, and support networks, directly affecting mission continuity and data integrity. This paper analyzes the main attack vectors that ransomware could exploit in the space ecosystem, including flaws in satellite control software, weaknesses in ground-space communications, and risks associated with the supply chain. To address these threats, prevention and resilience strategies based on recognized cybersecurity frameworks (NIST SP 800-61, ISO/IEC 27035, MITRE ATT&CK) are proposed, prioritizing network segmentation, the use of secure communication protocols, the implementation of data recovery mechanisms, and the preservation of evidence. Likewise, the need for international cooperation between space agencies, air forces, cyber defense agencies, and private actors is highlighted, in order to establish a global defense against this emerging threat. As a practical contribution, an isolated laboratory (LABNET) in the ground segment is presented, demonstrating the applicability of a minimum incident response playbook, evaluating time to detection (TTD) and time to recovery (TTR) metrics. This hybrid approach, which combines strategic analysis and experimental validation, seeks to strengthen the resilience of space missions against ransomware attacks, ensuring both operational continuity and data integrity. Copyright

Instituciones: Universidad Nacional Tecnológica de Lima Sur; Universidad Nacional de Moquegua