Ontological Qualification and Unity of the Ways of Being

Ivanoff-Sabogal C. · Studia Heideggeriana (2025) · DOI: 10.46605/sh.vol14.2025.283

Resumen

This paper addresses two questions raised by Heidegger in The Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology. The first concerns the instance from which the ways of Being (existence, ready-to-hand, etc.) would be qualified as belonging to Being. The second concerns the apprehen-sion of the unity of Being given that it is characterised by a variety of ways. Heidegger leaves both questions unanswered; our research deals hermeneutically-phenomenologically with this challenge in two steps. First, the ontological qualification of the ways of Being as ways of Being is not achieved by subsuming them under a simple concept of Being, but by their de-termination as meaning and ground of beings; in this we show that they partially identify with Being itself. Second, the variety of the ways of Being finds its unity in the pre-ontological understanding of concrete Dasein, in which takes place the simultaneous openness of the existential way of Being and the categorical ways of Being.

Instituciones: Universidad del Pacífico