KNOWLEDGE AND FREE WILL

Renzi F. · Person and Knowledge (2025) · DOI: 10.1108/978-1-83708-990-120251008

Resumen

The cognitive act is a responsible activity. Indeed, it should be noted that intentionality in a strict sense directly concerns the free creation of the object by the cognizing subject: the object in the proper sense is not the "res" (referent) as such, but a specific aspect of the thing that the person freely wished to intend at a given moment. It is a thesis that should not be understood in terms of voluntarism or relativism. The theory of alethic logic and the analysis of some scholastic doctrines show that the thesis in question does not necessarily imply the adoption of the nominalist conception of "suppositio," according to which the object takes the form of a fiction that takes the place of individual and concrete things.

Instituciones: Universidad Católica San Pablo