From the Normative Sense of Law (achiev von Kelsen) to the Prescriptive Sense of Law; a Brief Reflection on Legal Knowledge Based on Kelsen’s Contributions

Castilla Colquehuanca J.S. · Vniversitas (2026) · DOI: 10.11144/javeriana.vj75.snda

Resumen

This paper, which is the product of one aspect of my postdoctoral research, aims to reflect on the meaning (or type) of “knowledge” (understanding and explanation of reality) produced in Law, based on the fundamental contribution made by Kelsen, on which legal knowledge should continue to be built. From the praxis or doxa of Law, it is clear that it always deals with rules of conduct, which means we do not say that Law has as its object of study “positive law” —the instrument we use to regulate reality— since these rules are either already positivized —static theory of the legal norm— to regulate reality, or they are constructed from the demands of the specific factual and legal circumstances —dynamic theory of the legal norm—; however, both require prior knowledge or critical legal understanding of reality. This is the thesis of the prescriptive sense of Law (whose support is the result sought with this space of study), present in all areas of Law (legislative —technical or instrumental legal knowledge—, jurisprudentia —practical legal knowledge—, and doctrinal —theoretical legal knowledge—), therefore, legal professionals study such knowledge to produce, interpret and apply the aforementioned rules (positiveized or not). To this end, the following questions are posed: What is the thesis of the prescriptive sense of Law, according to Kelsen’s contributions? What is legal knowledge in legal positivism? And how did Kelsen understand legal knowledge and what does the thesis of the normative sense of law refer to? Thus, the dogmatic and socio-historical method was used, as will be specified later.

Instituciones: Universidad Nacional del Altiplano